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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

LEO I. TANNEHILL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
No.
9154

vs.
LEWIS N. TERRY,

)

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant in his brief has made a statement of facts
which is considered to be sufficient, generally speaking, for
the purpose of this appeal. However, we have marshalled
additional pertinent facts which we respectfully invite the
court's attention to and desire that they be considered as a
supplement to the appellant's statement.
Plaintiff had watched the defendant hit one practice ball
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(Tr. 7). He was also familiar with the fact that when a person
strikes a golf ball with a golf club that there is a backswing
and follow-through (Tr. 17 & 18). When plaintiff stepped
forward to hit a ball he was immediately told by defendant
that he was not holding the club properly and was told to stand
aside and watch the defendant show him how to swing (Tr.
21) . Defendant told plaintiff to observe the angle of the club
as it came down in his hands and the angle of his body (Tr.
21) . He stood off to the side of the defendant and watched
the defendant raise the club and observed defendant's backswing, immediately prior to being struck (Tr. 23). Plaintiff
did nothing when he saw the defendant begin to swing the
club and in fact admitted watching the defendant's action
but did not move from the time he noticed defendant addressing
the ball until he was struck by the club (Tr. 23 & 39).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE
QUESTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO THE JURY.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS APPLIED TO THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE, AND SUCH INSTRUCTION WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE
QUESTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO THE JURY.
On page four of plaintiffs brief, he admits receiving a
warning from the defendant and subsequent to this warning,
the defendant addressed the ball for some time before swinging the club. Plaintiff further admits that he is familiar with
the way a golf club is swung and that he himself has done so
(Tr. 17). Plaintiff stood back and watched the defendant
address the ball and then swing the club without taking any
precautions for his own safety (Tr. 23 and 39). It is submitted
that the plaintiff, by standing near the defendant and at all
times watching him, could not help but have full knowledge
that the defendant was going to swing the club. He also
testified to knowing the way a golf club is swung from watching
others, and admitted that on this very day and immediately
prior to the accident, he had observed the defendant swing
the club. Plaintiff could not help but have been aware of the
simple fact that if he stood too close to the defendant while
the defendant was swinging the golf club, that he very likely
would be struck by the club. This is purely a case of voluntary
exposure to obvious danger, which was and should have been
perfectly apparent to the plaintiff. We accordingly cannot
agree with plaintiff's statement on page five of his brief wherein
he says:
"We submit that the only real defense of assumption
of risk is the first type, that the second type is, and can
only be, contributory negligence."
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This court, in the case of Clay vs. Dunford, 121 Utah 177,
239 Pac. 2d 1075, has said otherwise:
"The essential elements of assumed risk are knowledge, actual or implied, by the plaintiff of a specific
defect or dangerous condition caused by the negligence
of the defendant in violaton of some duty owing to the
plamtiff, . . . " (Italics ours).
Thus, we respectfully submit, that this court has clearly
held that there may be an assumption of risk although the
defendant does owe a duty to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff further argues on page five of his brief:
"In order for there to be contributory negligence
there must not only be an intentional exposure to danger
created by defendant's negligence, but, also, that exposure must be unreasonable."
This is not a correct statement of the law and such reasoning
is obviously fallacious. It would eliminate the defense of contributory negligence where the plaintiff negligently exposed
himself to danger without any intent. The authorities opposing
plaintiff's reasoning are too numerous to mention.
A careful review of Clay vs. Dunford, Supra, will reveal
facts clearly distinguishing that case from the present case
concerning the application of the doctrine of assumption of
risk. In the Clay case, the plaintiff not only did not see 'the
defendant's vehicle but was walking with his back toward
the vehicle. He was also not in a position on the roadway that
would normally have been dangerous. In the present case,
plaintiff admittedly looked and saw the defendant in a position
preparing to swing and then watched him swing the golf club
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(Tr. 23, 38, & 39). The peril was obvious to anyone who
looked and saw, as did the plaintiff. Plaintiff also admitted
that he watched the defendant swing at one ball and had
watched other golfers swing at golf balls as well as having
done so himself on occasion (Tr. 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 38 and
39). Therefore, unlike the Clay case, our instant plaintiff did
look, and did see, and accordingly the peril was obvious. The
same distinguishing features are present in the instant case when
compared with the case of Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d
268, 342 Pac. 2d 884, cited in plaintiff's brief. In the Johnson
case, the plaintiff admittedly did not see the oncoming emergency vehicle and therefore could not be charged with assuming
a risk when she was completely unaware of its presence.
The plaintiff has cited the case of Brady vs. Kane, 111
Southern 2d 472, as "a case very similar to the one at bar
. . . " A review of the facts in the Brady case will readily
disclose the lack of similarity. In that case, the plaintiff was
one of a golf foursome. The players were on the tee, after
having played several holes, and the plaintiff was standing
behind the person preparing to drive the ball. Testimony was
to the effect that the plaintiff was to be the second man to drive.
While the first driver was addressing the ball the defendant,
standing behind the other members of the foursome, and
without warning, made a practice swing, striking the plaintiff
in the head. The facts clearly show that plaintiff was watching
the person preparing to drive and was looking down the fairway. He had his back turned to the defendant when the injury
occurred. We respectfully submit that there is no similarity
of facts whatsoever inasmuch as the plaintiff in the instant
case has admitted observing the movements of the defendant
7
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before he swung the club. He was also warned by the defendant
to stand back and observe his movements, while he prepared
to further demonstrate how to properly swing a golf club. In
the Brady case, the court further said:
"A member of a golfing foursome assumes certain
obvious and ordinary risks of the sport by participating
therein with knowledge of its normal dangers ... "
This clearly demonstrates that anyone familiar with the sport
must realize that you canot stand within club's distance of the
person about to swing without assuming the risk of being
struck by the club. Such is true of other sports, including baseball, tennis, or hockey, etc.
In our instant case, the plaintiff, after having been warned
to step back, apparently chose a position so close to the defendant that he must have known there was a very great
probability that he would be struck with the club when the
defendant proceeded with his demonstration.
We see little point in belaboring this court with a lengthy
discussion concerning plaintiff's argument in his brief wherein
he apparently denies that there can be an assumption of risk
doctrine applied where the defendant is negligent, for the
reason that plaintiff's own authorities do not support him
in that respect. In the cited case of Rogers vs. Los Angeles
Transit Lines, 45 Cal. 2d 414, 289 Pac. 2d 226, the court said:
"While a person, if fully informed, may assume the
risk even though the dangerous condition is caused
by the negligence of others." (Italics ours).
The court then cited Prescott vs. Ralph's Grocery Company,
8
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42 Cal. 2d 158, 265 Pac. 2d 904, and quoting from that case
stated:
"The plaintiff does not assume the risk of any negligence which he has no reason to anticipate, but once
he is fully informed of it, it is well settled that the
risks arising from such negligence may be assumed."
See also Prosser on Torts, page 385.
The case of Garcia vs. San Gabriel Ready Mix Company,
155 Cal. Appeal2d 568, 318 Pac. 2d 145, cited by the plaintiff,
is of little help as the facts in that case indicated that the
plaintiff could understand but very little English and the
defendant's employee could not understand the plaintiff's
language and as a result plaintiff obviously did not understand
the risk or danger involved through his conversations with the
workman. The Supreme Court of California in the case of
Prescott vs. Ralph's Grocery Company, supra, further said:
"As we have seen, the elements of assumption of
risk are a person's knowledge and appreciation of
the danger involved and his voluntary acceptance of
the risk. It follows that a person, if he is fully informed,
may assume a risk even though the dangerous condition is caused by the negligence of others. Indeed,
the cases in which this defense is applied, usually involve dangerous conditions created by the negligence
of another."
Suffice it to say, this court does recognize the doctrine
of assumption of risk when applied to appropriate facts where
defendant's negligence or lack of due care has created a dangerous situation which plaintiff could have, but voluntarily and
deliberately fails to avoid and thereby asumes the risk of
being injured.
9
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We therefore respectfully submit that in our instant case
the trail court properly submitted assumption of risk to the
Jury.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS APPLIED TO THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE, AND SUCH INSTRUCTION WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF.
Defendant respectfully submits that the court's instruction
on assumption of risk was a correct statement of the law as
applied to the factual situation herein and was in no way
prejudicial to the plaintiff. The undisputed evidence clearly
shows that the plaintiff saw the defendant about to swing
the club, as the defendant took some time to address the ball.
Plaintiff admitted having been told to stand back and observe
the defendant and his actions. He admits that he did stand
back and stood observing the defendant address the ball and
swing the club. He apparently did nothing to remove himself
from the obvious condition of peril in which he voluntarily
placed himself. His own testimony clearly shows that he was
aware of the conditions as they existed, and stood by and
watched the defendant swing the club which thereafter struck
him in the head. We respectfully submit that under these
circumstances, the court's instruction fairly and adequately
covered the factual situation and there has been no showing
in plaintiff's brief that such instruction was in any manner
prejudicial to plaintiff or his cause.
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As this court recently said in the case of Ferguson vs.
Jongsma, 350 Pac. 2d 404, decided March 22, 1960, speaking
through Mr. Justice Wade:

"If the instruction is based on a factual situation
which would support a finding of contributory negligence but the instruction erroneously called it assumption of risk, this alone would not be prejudicial error.''
In the aforementioned Instruction No. 8, the trial court
correctly set forth the law as it applied to our instant factual
situation. The court said in effect that if plaintiff knew of the
dangerous conduct of the defendant, or that he should have
known of such from the perfectly obvious conduct of the
defendant, and that plaintiff with this knowledge voluntarily
placed himself or remained in the position of danger, then
plaintiff assumed the risk and if the jury so found, then he
would not be entitled to recover from the defendant any
damage caused to him without intention on the part of the
defendant.
We are unable to visualize a more appropriate factual
situation than the one at hand to apply the doctrine of assumption of risk. Certainly plaintiff cannot contend that he didn't
have knowledge of the dangerous situation as it then existed
any more than a person sitting as a spectator in the grandstand
at a baseball game could say that no risk had been assumed
after being struck by a ball hit by one of the batters in the
game. The facts unequivocally show that the instant plaintiff
voluntarily and deliberately failed to avoid the situation and
certainly thereby assumed the risk of any injury he may have
sustained when struck by the golf club. The mere fact that
plaintiff failed to take any action to duck or step aside indicates
11
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that he accepted the obvious, and thereby brought himself
within an area where this doctrine would be applicable. At
any rate, under both the doctrine of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk, whether the plaintiff failed to use due
care for his own safety or he deliberately assumed the risk
of injury in the face of known danger, was a jury question
(italics ours). See Ferguson vs. Jongsma, supra. Also, Esernia
vs. Overland Moving Company, 1949, 115 Utah 519, 205
Pac. 2d 621.
Plaintiff undoubtedly contends that he didn't know that
defendant intended to swing the club and only that he thought
defendant would merely make a backswing. The evidence fails
to support this contention, particularly when defendant testified: "Leo, will you get out of the way. I am going to hit the
ball" (Tr. 44). Thus it became a jury question as to what
occurred and the trial court properly submitted the case to
the jury on both theories of contributory negligence and assumption of risk insofar as the affirmative defense aspect
of the case was concerned. We accordingly respectfully submit
that the court was not in error in its Instruction No. 8 as given
to the jury.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully and earnestly contend that the trial court
lawfully and properly submitted the defense of asumption of
risk to the jury and that the instruction to the jury in that respect
was proper and not prejudicial to the plaintiff. We further
submit that the verdict in favor of the defendant and against
12
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the plaintiff "No Cause of Action" should be affirmed on this
appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
Counsel for Defendant and Respondent
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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